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will be decisive of the validity of the transfer? It will be the secret
motive of the transferror." 25 Thus, until there are further decisions
on the point, a transferee may only be safe today, if he makes sure
that his transferor's wife joins in the transfer or conveyance-for in
this substitute for dower, the courts seem to have found a new
favorite.
Louis H. RUBINSTEIN.

IS THE PROBLEM OF DISREGARDING THE CORPORATE ENTITY MORE A
QUESTION OF FACT THAN OF LAW?

All authorities agree that, in certain instances, a corporation is
to be regarded as an entity, while in other cases, the real parties in
interest must be found. The problem of disregarding the corporate
entity has become increasingly complex as the mechanism of the corporation has grown to dominant proportions through the use of subsidiary corporations. Under the cover of holding companies, "the
legitimate use of subsidiaries has become obscured by a too frequent
manipulation of accounting and credit; so that lawyers, bankers, and
courts are now faced with complicated structures in which the actual
interests can not readily be discerned." I The difficult problem for
student and lawyer alike is to learn when to apply the theory of the
existence of the corporation as a separate entity, and when fearlessly
to disregard it.2 The difficulty of form is negligible; and courts of
equity should unravel all forms of evasion of obligation, even though
the formation is accomplished'by a certificate of incorporation and
stock certificates. 3 It is not to be denied that equity should,
on proper
4
facts, restrain the 'unconscionable use of any legal right.
'Dissenting opinion by Untermyer, J., in instant case, Bodner v. Feit, at
p. 820, cited supra, note 18.
"(1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 874 (A. A. Berle, Jr., gives an excellent discussion of "two causes for concern arising out of the development of the device
of subsidiary corporations. The first evil is that the financial structure of the
subsidiary corporation lends itself to the use of that subsidiary's financial
resources in other enterprises controlled by the dominant corporation. Secondly, the subsidiary proves a convenient medium by which a parent may
acquire property apparently freed from restrictive covenants or agreements
which bind the parent").
(1912) 12 COL. L. REv. 496.
' Transfers of property to a subsidiary corporation for the purpose of
evading an obligation of the parent were discussed in the case of Higgins v.
California Petroleum & Asphalt Co., 147 Cal. 363, 81 Pac. 1070 (1905) (There
was no actual fraud, but the court held all three companies jointly liable on the
ground that the necessary effect of the conveyance was to hinder collection of
royalties by the lessor and that the identity of control of the corporations

made them all liable). The case is commented on in WORMSER, DIsREGARD
THE CORPORATE FIcTIoN (1927) 59-61, and in (1928) 41 HARV. L. Ray. 874.

OF

"People v. North River Sugar Ref. Co., 121 N. Y. 582, 24 N. E. 834
(1890); State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N. E. 279 (1892);
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It is fundamental that control through mere ownership of a majority or of even all the capital stock, and the use of the power incidental thereto, to elect officers and directors will not, in and of itself,
predicate liability. 5 It is, of course, recognized that the stockholders
are the real participants in every corporate suit.6 The corporate entity has been disregarded, however, where a corporation resorted to
stock ownership in another corporation so as to use the latter company as its agent or instrumentality.7 In a recent New York case,8
it was held that a judgment-creditor could not under the instrumentality rule recover the value of assets fraudulently transferred by a
debtor to the corporation engaged in foreign trade, as against railroad
and terminal corporations which owned stock in the trading corporation. The evidence showed that the plan of organizing the trading
corporation, percentages of stock control, and transfer of business
(1907) 20

HARV.

L. REv. 223-224; (1910) 23

HARV.

L. Rv. 216; (1928) 41

HARv. L. REV. 918; MORAWETZ, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1886) § 227.
Kingston Dry Dock v. Lake Champlain Transporting Co., 31 F. (2d) 265
(C. C. A. 2d, 1929); Exchange Bank v. Macon Construction Co., 97 Ga. 1,
25 S. E. 326 (1895); Sellers v. Greer, 172 Ill. 549, 50 N. E. 246 (1898); G.
Stagg Co. v. Taylor, 113 Ky. 709, 718, 68 S. W. 869 (1902); Old Dominion
Copper Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N. E. 193 (1909) ; Stone v. Cleveland,
C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 202 N. Y. 352, 95 N. E. 816 (1911) ("It is well established
that the ownership of a majority of the stock of a corporation, while it gives a
certain control of the corporation, does not give that control of corporate
transactions which makes the holder of the stock responsible for the latter.") ;
In re Mt. Sinai Hospital, 250 N. Y. 103, 164 N. E. 871 (1928) ; Rapid Transit
Construction Co. v. City of New York, 259 N. Y. 472, 182 N. E. 145 (1932) ;
Senior v. New York City R. Co., 111 App. Div. 39, 97 N. Y. Supp. 645 (1st
Dept. 1906), aff'd, 187 N. Y. 559 (memo. 1907) ; Cleary v. Higley, 154 Misc.
158, 277 N. Y. Supp. 63 (1934); Commonwealth v. Monongahela Bridge Co.,
216 Pa. St. 108, 64 AtI. 909 (1906) ; Button v. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 20, 20 N. W.
667 (1884). But Maryland holds that a corporation is not ,a separate entity
when its stock is owned wholly by one person. Swift v. Smith, Dixon & Co.,
65 Md. 428, 434, 5 Ati. 534 (1896) ; The Bellona Company's case, 3 Bland 422
(Md. 1831) senible; First National Bank of Gadsen v. Winchester, 119 Ala.
168, 24 So. 351 (1898) relied on the Maryland decisions. This disregard of
the entity theory is unsound.
' State v. Young, 31 Fla. 594, 12 So. 673 (1893).
'Miller & Lux v. East Side Canal Co., 221 U. S. 286, 29 Sup. Ct. 111
(1911) ; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. et at. v. Cities Service Co. et al., 281 Fed. 214
(D. Del. 1922) (the parent company was liable for torts of its subsidiary);
In re Eiler's Music House, 270 Fed. 915 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921) (assets of subsidiary held assets of bankrupt parent company) ; Dillard, etc., Co. v. Richmond
Cotton Oil Co., 140 Tenn. 290, 204 S. W. 758 (1918) (the holding company
was liable for debts of its subsidiary); Higgins v. California P. A. Co., 147
Cal. 363, 81 Pac. 1070 (1905) (an attempt to evade obligations under a lease);
(1929) 42 HARv, L. REv. 1077; (1922) 35 HAv. L. REV. 204.
'Lowendahl v. The Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 247 App. Div. 144, 287
N. Y. Supp. 62 (Ist Dept. 1936), af'd, 272 N. Y. 360, - N. E. (1936)
(where parent company exercises such control that subsidiary has become mere
instrumentality of parent's business and parent is actor, or where business and
officers of two corporations have become inextricably confused, and such control
has been used by parent to commit fraud or violate other legal duty, or to
accomplish dishonesty or other unjust conduct and results in unjust loss and
injury, parent will be held liable for subsidiary's obligation).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 11

were the debtor's ideas; that the trading corporation was conducting
its own business and was not a mere department of the railroad or
a mere dummy or instrumentality; that the railroad or terminal corporations did not exercise control over the real business of the trading corporation; that the terminal corporation guaranteed loans of the
trading corporation and the railroad made advances thereto. The
case states the essential elements necessary to hold a subsidiary corporation as a mere instrumentality of its parent. "In any case except
express agency, estoppel, or direct tort,9 three elements must be
proved. (1) Control, not mere majority, or complete stock control,
but complete domination, not only of finances, but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind,
will or existence of its own; and (2) Such control must have been
used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, the violation of a
statutory or other positive legal duty, or a dishonest and unjust act
in contravention of plaintiff's legal rights; and (3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust
loss complained of."
The difficulty arises in discovering the disguises, not in penetrating them when they appear;this is apparent from a comparison of the
majority and dissenting opinion in the Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry.
case.10 The dissenting opinion, which shows a better grasp of the
9
Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Anoka National Bank, 108 Fed. 482 (C. C. A.
8th, 1901); Davis v. Alexander, 269 U. S. 114, 117, 46 Sup. Ct. 34 (1925);
Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. v. Dupont, 128 Fed. 840 (C. C. A. 2d, 1904); Lehigh
Valley R. R. Co. v. Delachisa, 145 Fed. 617 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906); Minifie v.
Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 (1922); Stone v. Cleveland, C., C. and

St. L. Ry. Co., 202 N. Y. 352, 95 N. E. 816 (1911). See POWELL, PARENT
cc. 1-6, passhi, and numerous cases cited.
" Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. 58 (1926) (Plaintiff sued to recover damages for personal injuries received through the negligence of a motorman, an employee of a subsidiary of the defendant; the
defendant owned substantially all the common stock of the subsidiary; the
executive officers, president, treasurer, general manager, paymaster and counsel
of the two companies were the same and the directors nearly so; the defendant
made numerous loans to the subsidiary, including loans for construction and
sometimes for operating expenses, and owned all the second mortgage bonds
of the subsidiary; the cars of both companies were labelled, "Third Avenue
System"; the parent leased the cars to the subsidiary for a daily rental; one
legal department, one accounting department, and one claim department functioned for the entire system. Yet the Court of Appeals held that even these
facts were not sufficient to show such identity that the parent corporation would
be liable. The court said, "Liability of the parent has riever been adjudged
when the subsidiary has maintained so consistently, and in so many Ways as
here, the separate organization that is the mark of a separate existence, and
when the implication of a contract for unity of operation would be the implication of a contract for the commission of a crime." Crane, J., cited the same
authorities in his dissenting opinion.) (The U. S. Supreme Court in Davis
v. Alexander, 269 U. S. 114, 46 Sup. Ct. 34 (1925) said, "Where one railroad
company actually controls another and operates both as a single system, the
dominant company will be liable for injuries due to the negligence of the
subsidiary company.") In Stone v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 202
AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS (1931)
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facts, seems to be the more logical. Here again it is more a question
of interpretation of facts than of law, in determining whether the dominance and control is so complete as to hold the parent company liable
for the acts of its subsidiary." Of course, where it is established that
a corporation is a mere agency or partnership, there is no trouble in
holding the parent company liable.12 The courts have shown much
judicial impatience with attempts to delay, hamper or defraud creditors by means of dummy corporations. 13 The entity is disregarded
when the separate corporate existence is a mere sham or device to
evade an existing obligation,' 4 when it is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime; 15 or when
the subsidiary is used fraudulently to secure immunity by parent from
liabilities which the parent had previously undertaken, or to accomplish fraud or an illegal act. 16 The same rule has been applied in
N. Y. 352, 95 N. E. 816 (1911), it was held that, "the ownership of a majority

of stock of a corporation does not give that control of corporate transactions
which makes the holder responsible for the latter." The statement in Stone v.
Cleveland is not applicable when stock ownership has been resorted to, not for
the purpose of participating in the affairs of a corporation in the normal and
usual manner, but for the purpose, as in this case, of controlling a subsidiary
company, so that it may be used as a mere agency or instrumentality of the
company or companies.
'J. J. McCaskell Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 504, 30 Sup. Ct. 386
(1910) ; York Mfg. Co. v. Brewster, 174 Fed. 566 (C. C. A. 5th, 1909) ; In re
Waterton Paper, 169 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909); Bauernschmidt v. Bauernschmidt, 101 Md. 148, 60 Atl. 437 (1905); Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 91
Mich. 166, 51 N. V. 981 (1892) ; Barnes v. Smith, 48 Mont. 309, 137 Pac. 541
(1913); Home Fire Insurance Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 93 N. W. 1024
(1903). See LATry, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFmiATED CORPORATIONS (1936) § 50
at pp. 205-6.
' N. Y. Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 Fed. 668, 673 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
' First National Bank v. Trebein Co., 59 Ohio St. 316, 52 N. E. 834
(1898) (courts ignore the entity concept when used as a shield for attempts to
swindle creditors) ; Montgomery Web Co. v. Denelt, 133 Pa. St. 585, 19 Atl.
486 (1890) (the difference is a mere juggle of names).
" Higgins v. California Petroleum and Asphalt Company, et al., 147 Cal.
363, 81 Pac. 1070 (1903) (The courts even without regard to actual fraud are
wont to disregard the entity theory); Donovan v. Purtell, 216 Il. 629, 641,
75 N. E. 334 (1905) (Mr. Justice Magruder, speaking for the Supreme Court
of Illinois said, "* * * when appellant received appellee's money, he was not

conducting business under a bona fide corporate organization, but was using a
corporate entity for the transaction of his private business.").
"Martin v. D. B. Martin Co., 10 Del. Ch. 211, 88 Atl. 612 (1913); South
Florida Citrus Land Co. v. Walden, 61 Fla. 766, 55 So. 862 (1911) ; Kellogg v.
Douglas County Bank, 58 Kan. 43, 48 Pac. 587 (1897).
11(1933) 47 HARv. L. REV. 135 discussing Berry v. Old South Engraving
Co., 283 Mass. 441, 186 N. E. 601 (1933) (corporation A contracted with the
plaintiff union to employ only union men. For the express purpose of continuing in the same business with an open shop, the corporation discharged its
men and discontinued business, as it had a right to do under the contract. Its
stockholders then organized corporation B, which carried on the business with
the same property, stockholders and officers, but employed non-union men.
Plaintiff filed a bill against both corporations to enjoin the violation of the
contract and to recover damages. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff
appealed. Held, that despite the motive of the incorporators to escape an
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determining rights and liabilities when the same persons have associated themselves together under corporate names and organizations
for the7 purposes of carrying out several branches of a single enterprise.'
Many decisions, which only apparently involve the "fiction" must
be eliminated from consideration 18 -for example, where the "public
inconvenience, wrong, fraud, or crime," 19 can be prevented through
other legal principles. 20 Take, for instance, the Hall Safe Co. v. Herring etc. case,2 1 where the court, fully maintaining the doctrine of a
corporate entity, held that a corporation's promise not to engage in a
certain business, assented to by its principal stockholders, bound
neither them, nor a new corporation formed by them.m Likewise, in
24
3
,Stateex rel. Johnson & Higgins Co. v. Safford,2 since the statute
looked primarily to the personal qualifications of those seeking to conduct a local insurance agency, it might reasonably have been interpreted as forbidding the issuance of a license to a corporation, regardless of who might hold its stock.25 The statute provided that no
person might be licensed to act as an insurance agent unless he was
a resident of Ohio. Mandamus was brought by the state of Ohio on
existing obligation, corporation B was not bound by the contract of corporation A. Decree affirmed). In allowing use of the corporate fiction to avoid
present obligations, the case is apparently opposed to the trend of decisions.
See Canfield, Scope of the Corporate Entity Theory (1917) 17 COL. L. Rv.
128, 141; cf. Rapid Transit Subway Construction Co. v. New York, 259 N. Y.
472, 182 N. E. 145 (1932); Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 224 U. S.
294, 37 Sup. Ct. 506 (1917) (a corporation, in fraud of creditors, transferred
its assets to a new company, the creditors were allowed to reach the assets
without regard to the corporate form); The Berry v. Old South Engraving
Co. case apparently fails to distinguish between the use of the corporate device
to avoid future liabilities and its use to evade present obligations. Home Fire
Insurance Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 664, 93 N. W. 1024 (1903). See BALLANTINE,
PRvATE CoRpoRATIoNs (1st ed. 1927) § 6.
. Kendall v. Klapperthal Co., 202 Pa. 546, 52 Atl. 92. (1902) (sustaining
reimbursement of directors by one of such corporations for advances made by
them to another of such corporations). And see Bloch Queensware Co. v.
Metzger, 70 Ark. 232, 65 S. W. 929 (1901).
(1907) 20 HARV. L. REv. 223-224.
'See
United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Tr. Co., 142 Fed. 247
(E. D. Wis., 1905).
(1917) 17 CAL. L. Rav. 128; (1929) 42 HARV. L. REv. 1077; see Canfield,
The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory (1917) 17 Cor. L. Ray.
128-143.
21146 Fed. 37 (C. C. A. 6th, 1906).
'Moore, etc. Co. v. Towers, etc. Co., 87 Ala. 206, 6 So. 41 (1889) (Here
the stockholders might readily have been bound by individual contracts,
breaches of which equity would enjoin; and the new corporation might then
very possibly be enjoined as a confederate in these illegal acts); Lewis v.
Gollner, 129 N. Y. 227, 29 N. E. 81 (1891).
t 159 N. E. 829 (Ohio 1927) discussed in (1928) 41 HARv. L. REy. 918.
OHIo GENEMAL CODE § 644.
"La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465, 39 Sup. Ct. 160 (1919) ; State
Trust & Savings Bank v. Hermosa Land and Cattle Co., 30 N. M. 566, 240
Pac. 469 (1925); see (1918) 31 HARv. L. Ray. 894; (1926) 39 HAnv. L.

Ray. 652.
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the relation of an Ohio corporation to compel the defendant, the state
superintendent of insurance, to issue to the corporation a license to
act in the capacity of a resident insurance agent. The majority of
the stock of the corporation was held by a foreign corporation. The
defendant demurred. Held, that the corporate entity will be ignored
in order to prevent the circumvention of the statute. In another
case, 26 in which a mandamus proceeding against the transferee was
allowed, the entity reasoning seemed unnecessary. The transferror
was bound to operate certain street railways which the defendant purchased with notice. As the right to specific performance of the contract will attach to the property to which it relates, so it seems does
the right to maintain a mandamus proceeding.2 7 Other examples are:
The adjudication, that conveyances to corporations by insolvent grantors are fraudulent, rests not upon the basis that there is no real conveyance, but upon the strong evidence that the conveyances are only
to the intent and effect of defrauding the grantor's creditors; 28 cases
resulting from ultra-vires doctrines,29 and from the doctrine that a
fraudulently formed corporation has no legal existence.30 Moreover,
the opinion in the Northern Securities Co. v. United States case 3s
indicates no belief that the result hinged on disregarding the corporate entity. Justice Brewer pointed out that where a corporation was
organized merely as a convenient means of combining separate railroad properties under one control, the court could shake aside the web
of entity and regard the combination as just "as direct a restraint of
trade by destroying competition as the appointment of a committee
to regulate rates." And it is also noticeable that in questions of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts over suits to which a corporation is
a party, substantially the same result has been reached by conclusive
presumptions as would logically follow the conception of a corporate
entity. For the purpose of preserving the jurisdiction of the federal
courts over corporations, depending on the citizenship of parties, it
is held that a corporation is an association of persons who may have
citizenship, and following this with the adoption of the fiction of law,
supported by a conclusive presumption by which the members of a
corporation are conclusively presumed to be citizens of the state cre'State v. Brood River Power Co., 153 S. E. 537 (S. C. 1929), aff'd, 281
U. S. 539 (1930), rehearing granted, 51 Sup. Ct. 38 (1930), discussed in (1930)

44 HI Rv. L. RFv. 260 at 265.
'Mayor of Borough of Rutherford v. Hudson River Traction Co., 73
N. J. L. 227, 63 At. 84 (1906).
. ' Booth v. Bunce, 33 N. Y. 139 (1865).
But cf. First etc., Bank v.
Trebein Co., 59 Ohio St. 316, 52 N. E. 834 (1898) ("The good faith of the
parties to such a transaction must be determined by its legal effect on the
rights of others."); Cincinnati Volksblatt Co. v. Hoffmeister, 62 Ohio St. 189,
200, 56 N. E. 1033 (1900) ; CooK ON CoapORATioNs (4th ed. 1898) p. 23.
' See Note (1907) 20 HARV. L. Ryv. 223-224.
Brundred v. Rice, 49 Ohio St. 640, 32 N. E. 169 (1892).
n Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S.197, 24 Sup. Ct. 436

(1904).
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Finally, in Hart Steel Co. v. R. R. Supply Co.,3 3 it was
held that a decision in a patent suit against a wholly owned subsidiary
was res adjudicataas against8 the
parent on the ground that there was
4
a complete entity of interest.
Another line of cases, in which incorporation is used to evade
or circumvent a statute, should give no practical difficulty in regard
to the entity theory. In these cases, the entity will be upheld except
where used to defeat the purpose of the statute. Most of the decisions rest on the policy of the court to seek the legislative intent in
construing a statute. The commodities clause 35 cases 36 are perhaps
ating it.32

the most interesting on this point.8 7 Mr. Justice Harlan, in a dissenting opinion, shows conclusively in one of them,38 that the analysis
is one of legislative intent. "Any other view of the act will enable
the transporting railroad, by one device or another, to depart altogether from the purpose which Congress had in view, which was to
divorce in a real, substantial sense, production and transportation, and

thereby to prevent the transporting company from doing injustice to
other owners * * *." 89

Along this same line of reasoning, it has

' Louisville etc. Ry. Co. v. Letson, 43 U. S. 496, 11 L. Ed. 353 (S. C. 1844) ;
Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co., 57 U. S. 313, 14 L. Ed. 953 (Md.
1853).

See (1907) 20 HARv. L. REv. 223-224.

'244 U. S. 294, 37 Sup. Ct. 506 (1917).
' Gulf Co. v. Llewellyn, 248 U. S. 71, 39 Sup. Ct. 35 (1918) (the separate
technical existence of the subsidiaries did not prevent them from being "parts
of one enterprise all owned by the petitioner.") ; Chicago, etc., Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic Ass'n., 247 U. S. 490, 38 Sup. Ct. 553 (1918) (The fact that a
subsidiary was a separate legal entity did not prevent the subsidiary rates from
being treated as one with those of the parent corporation, where the subsidiary
was wholly owned) ; see Southern Pacific Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 330, 38 Sup.
Ct. 540 (1918).
'Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 1, 34 STAT. 585, 49 U. S. C. A. 1, par. 8.
repeated by Act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, § 7, 36 STAT. 347 ("It shall be unlawful for any railroad company to transport from any State, Territory, or the
District of Columbia, to any other State, Territory, or the District of Columbia,
or to any foreign country, any article or commodity, other than timber and the
manufactured products thereof, mined, or produced by it, or under its authority,
or which it may own in whole, or in part, or in which it may have any interest,
direct or indirect, * * * ").
' United States v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 220 U. S. 257, 31 Sup. Ct. 287
(1911) ; United States v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 56 Sup. Ct. 841 (1936), aff't,
11 F. Supp. 435; (1912) 12 COL. L. REv. 496; (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv. 874;
(1928) 41 HARV. L. Rav. 918; (1929) 42 HARv. L. REV. 1077.
'United States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366. 415, 29 Sup.
Ct. 527 (1909) ; United States v. Elgin J. & E. Ry. Co., 56 Sup. Ct. 841 (1936)
(Holding company's ownership of all stock of subsidiary does not, as a matter
of law, make subsidiary an agent, instrumentality, or department of holdin-,
company, but existence of such intimate relation is a question of fact to be
determined on the evidence, as respects whether subsidiary railroad company
which transports products of subsidiary producing companies is violating the
commodity clause).
,' United States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 29 Sup. Ct.
527 (1909),
' Olds and Whipple v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 75 F. (2d) 272
(C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; Munson S. S. Line v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
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been held that, "there is no magic in incorporation which can purge
a monopolizing scheme of its shiny, greedy viciousness." 40 In these
41
cases it has become necessary to recognize the individual members.
It is apparent that a corporation is a purely artificial body created by
law.42 Each corporation is a distinct entity; but courts will look
behind form when the corporation, in the perpetration of fraud, or
evasion of responsibility, is a mere dummy or alter ego or conduit of
individuals, or of another corporation. 43 "Subsidiary corporations
not only have legitimate uses, but also are, in most cases, legitimately
used. There is no reason to assume they are essentially vicious, or
that the building up of a structure based on the interdependent corporate units is not sound. ' 44 The obvious pitfall, in judicial determination, is in a construction of the facts. "There seems to be a general
tendency to underestimate the power of a court of equity in granting
relief." 45 In equity, the conception of corporate entity is merely a
formula for working out rights and equities of the real parties in
interest, 40 and the "abstraction of the corporate entity should never
be allowed to bar out and prevent the real and obvious truth." 47

It

would seem that, in a proper case, especially where the equities are
77 F. (2d) 849 (C. C. A.
disregarded in exceptional
Refrigerator Transit Co.,
Woodstock Co., 281 Ill. 84,

2d, 1935) (separate entity of corporation can be
circumstance); see United States v. Milwaukee
142 Fed. 247 (E.1. Wis., 1905); Seymour v.
117 N. E. 729 (1917) ; Stockton v. Central R. R.

Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 52, 24 Atl. 964 (1892); Jenkins v. Moyse, 254 N. Y.

319, 172 N. E. 521 (1930), rev'g, 229 App. Div. 743, 241 N. Y. Supp. 901 (2d
Dept. 1930); Brundred v. Rice, 49 Ohio St. 640, 32 N. E. 169 (1892) (The
promoters of a corporation organized a separate entity for the purpose of
consummating an illegal railway rebate agreement, thinking no doubt to shield
themselves from consequences in that manner.

It was held that "the act of

incorporating can be of no avail to them as a defense." The court, penetrating

the sham, rightly declared that there was nothing "sacred in a certificate of
incorporation, and that their ingenious tricky device was of no avail.") ; First

National Bank v. Trebein Co., 59 Ohio St. 316, 52 N. E. 834 (1898) ; People's

Pleasure Park Co., Inc., et at. v. Rohleder, 109 Va. 439, 61 S. E. 794 (1908)
(The decision in this case, undoubtedly, rested on the "legal" intent of the
covenant); (1910) 23 HARv. L. REv. 216; (1918) 31 HAiV.L. REv. 894; (1926)
39 HARv. L. REv. 652; (1928) 41 HARv. L. Rv. 918.
"(1912) 12 COL. L. REv. 496 at 512.

"Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers Association, 155 Ill. 166, 29 N. E. 651
(1895) ; Southern Electric Securities Co. v. State, 91 Miss. 195, 44 So. 785
(1907).
"Leonard v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 75 F. (2d) 390 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935);
In re American Fibre Chair Seat Corp., 265 N. Y. 416, 193 N. E. 253 (1934).
"Forbush Co. v. Bartley, 78 F. (2d) 805 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935) ; C. L. and
L. Motor Express Co. v. Achenbach, 259 Ky. 288, 82 S.W. (2d) 335 (1935);
Fors v. Farrel, 271 Mich. 358, 260 N. W. 886 (1935).
"(1928) 41 HARv.L. REv. 874 at 892.
" (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 874 at 890, discussing Finch v. Warrior Cement.
"Hirsch v. Lincoln Securities Co., 118 Fla. 164, 160 So. 12 (1934).
"Seymour v. Spring Forest Cemetery Ass'n, 144 N. Y. 33, 39 N. E. 365

(1895).
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with the plaintiff, the courts will disregard the corporate fiction.48 A
proper interpretation of the facts seems to be the major stumbling
point.
SYDNEY SAXON.

"' For a good statement of the rule in New York see Chief Judge Pound's
opinion in Brooklyn Savings Bank v. Jos. Wechsler Estate, 259 N. Y. 9, at
p. 14, 180 N. E. 752 (1932) ("The law legitimatizes the limitation of personal
liability by the creation of corporations. Innocent parties acting in reliance
thereon should not be lulled into a false security nor should sudden divagations
be made from the path of the law in order to save old debts.") ; Klein v. Board
of Supervisors, 230 Ky. 182, 18 S.W. (2d) 1009 (1929), aff'd, 15 Sup. Ct. 15,
282 U. S.19 (1930) ("It leads nowhere to call a corporation a fiction. If it is
a fiction, it is a fiction created by law with intent that it should be acted on as
if true. The corporation is a person and its ownership is a nonconductor that
makes it impossible to attribute an interest in its property to its members).
Professor Wormser has attempted a generalization from decided cases of the
exception which disregards the corporate form. "When the conception of
corporate entity is employed to defraud creditors, to evade an existing obligation, to circumvent a statute, to achieve or perpetuate a monopoly, or to
protect knavery or crime, the courts will draw aside the rule of entity, will
regard the corporate company as an association of live, up-and-doing, men and
women shareholders, and will do justice between real persons."

